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INTRODUCTION 
In Grutter v. Bollinger,1
 
 * J.D., 2013, Santa Clara University School of Law.  The author now 
practices law in the area of commercial litigation. 
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
acknowledged, “race-conscious admissions policies must be 
 1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  
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limited in time”2 and the Court “expects that 25 years from 
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary 
to [further an interest in student body diversity].”3  While 
only ten years had passed since Justice O’Connor articulated 
this temporal estimate in Grutter, in February 2012 the 
Supreme Court was presented with the opportunity to 
prohibit public universities from considering race in selecting 
its incoming classes.4  In Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin,5 the Fifth Circuit upheld the University of Texas’s 
admissions policy of using race in selecting its students, 
agreeing with the district court’s assertion that “as long as 
Grutter remains good law, UT's current admissions program 
remains constitutional.” 6  The appellants in Fisher were 
granted a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court, essentially giving the Court the opportunity to respond 
to the Fifth Circuit’s assertion and declare Grutter no longer 
“remains good law.” 7
As the Court’s decision in Fisher could have ended the 
controversial “affirmative action” policies implemented by 
universities nationwide, this Comment will examine how the 
Court articulated and rationalized its decision.  In 
formulating this analysis, this Comment will scrutinize 
Fisher under the lens of the Court’s previous precedent, 
keeping in mind the Court’s compositional changes since 
Grutter, most notably Justice Alito’s occupation of O’Connor’s 
seat since her retirement in 2005.  Additionally, this 
Comment will analyze the importance of Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in the outcome of not only the Fisher case, but other 
recent Supreme Court decisions as well.  Lastly, this 
Comment will evaluate the multiple ways Fisher is factually 
  Considering the Court’s shift in 
ideological composition since deciding Grutter, such a ruling 
seemed very conceivable, creating the possibility of far-
reaching ramifications; however, in spite of this opportunity 
for change, the Court’s ultimate decision did relatively little 
to alter Grutter’s applicability. 
 
 2. Id. at 342. 
 3. Id. at 343. 
 4. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 613 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 7. Id. 
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distinguishable from Grutter, evincing how the Court ignored 
an opportunity to reverse Fisher without overruling its 
previous precedent. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DIVERSITY PRECEDENT AND THE 
ROAD TO FISHER 
Korematsu v. United States8 represents the first instance 
where the Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny standard 
to the government’s implementation of racial classifications.9  
Motivated by racist, anti-Japanese sentiment in the midst of 
World War II, the government prohibited all people of 
Japanese descent from West Coast military zones.10  Since the 
government’s discriminatory practice was ultimately 
upheld,11 Korematsu’s xenophobic and anachronistic opinion 
nonetheless remains significant as the first time the Supreme 
Court applied strict scrutiny to racial classifications.12  In 
spite of this position, however, the Court since 1978 has also 
applied strict scrutiny when governmental entities enact 
racially preferential programs.13  In Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke14 the Court held a governmental entity 
must have a compelling interest in racial classifications if not 
implemented with the intention of remedying purposeful 
discrimination.15
A. Bakke and Diversity’s Emergence 
 
In Bakke, the University of California at Davis School of 
Medicine implemented a race-based admissions program that 
ensured out of the 100 positions available for incoming 
students, at least sixteen of those positions would be held by 
minority applicants.16
 
 8. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
  Allan Bakke, a white male, was denied 
admission to the medical school twice and brought suit after 
 9. Id. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a 
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to 
the most rigid scrutiny.”). 
 10. Id. at 217–18. 
 11. Id. at 224. 
 12. Id. at 216. 
 13. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361–62 (1978). 
 14. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 15. Id. at 299. 
 16. Id. at 275. 
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learning minority candidates with significantly lower 
qualifications had been admitted under Davis’s special 
admissions program. 17   The Supreme Court ultimately 
determined the university’s admissions program was an 
unconstitutional quota system and amounted to an 
impermissible “line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic 
status.”18  Justice Powell, writing for the plurality opinion, 
stated that the attainment of a diverse student body is a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education; 19 however, “[e]thnic diversity . . . is only one 
element in a range of factors a university properly may 
consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student 
body.”20  Justice Powell also emphasized that while it was 
important to give universities “wide discretion in making the 
sensitive judgments as to who should be admitted,” such 
discretion must be curtailed by constitutional limitations.21
What gives Bakke significance in the context of Fisher is 
Justice Powell’s determination that “diversity is compelling in 
the context of a university’s admissions program”
 
22  and 
“clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal.” 23   This 
statement represents the first time the Supreme Court 
declared racial diversity as a compelling interest; however, in 
order for race-based considerations to be constitutional, 
Justice Powell, quoting Korematsu, stated that “ ‘[all] legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect . . . [and] courts must subject 
them to the most rigid scrutiny.’ ”24  Thus, under Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke, race-based considerations in a 
university’s admissions policy are constitutionally permissible 
only if (1) they serve a compelling governmental interest, (2) 
the admissions policy is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
interest, and (3) the policy represents the least restrictive 
means for achieving that interest.25
 
 17. Id. at 277. 
 
 18. Id. at 289. 
 19. Id. at 315. 
 20. Id. at 314. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 311–12. 
 24. Id. at 291 (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944)). 
 25. Id. at 299. 
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While Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke suggests that a 
diverse student body is a compelling interest that 
universities, subject to strict scrutiny analysis, may achieve 
through using race-based admissions considerations, the 
Court’s severely fractured plurality opinion left the lower 
courts unsure as to whether Powell’s opinion was binding.26  
For example, in the Fifth Circuit decision Hopwood v. Texas,27 
the court claimed “Justice Powell's argument in Bakke 
garnered only his own vote and has never represented the 
view of a majority of the Court in Bakke or any other case.”28  
More significantly, the Fifth Circuit declared in Hopwood 
that “[i]n Bakke, the word ‘diversity’ is mentioned nowhere 
except in Justice Powell's single-Justice opinion”29 and that 
the rest of the four-Justice opinion “implicitly rejected Justice 
Powell's position.”30  Therefore, the Fifth Circuit refused to 
consider Powell’s diversity opinion as binding precedent and 
determined that “there is essentially only one compelling 
state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past 
wrongs.”31  Thus, as a result of Bakke’s ambiguous plurality 
opinion, Powell’s “diversity as a compelling interest” position 
was largely cast aside as insignificant, and universities 
throughout the Fifth Circuit were forbidden from 
implementing racially preferential admissions policies in 
order to attain an ethnically diverse student body.32
Despite Bakke’s questionable influence on the issue of 
race-based considerations and diversity as a compelling 
interest, the Supreme Court offered further elucidation on the 
subject in its City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
 
33 decision in 
1989.  In Croson, the city of Richmond, Virginia required 
companies that were awarded city construction contracts to 
subcontract thirty percent of their business to minority 
business enterprises, 34 a requirement the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional.35
 
 26. Id. at 268. 
 
 27. Hopwood v. State of Tex., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 28. Id. at 944. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 945–46.  
 33. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 34. Id. at 477. 
 35. Id. at 486. 
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The Croson majority held that Richmond failed to 
demonstrate a compelling interest justifying its affirmative 
action program, ruling that mere generalized assertions of 
past racial discrimination are insufficient to authorize race-
based relief under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.36  Additionally, the Croson majority held 
that Richmond’s affirmative action plan was not sufficiently 
tailored to address the effects of prior discrimination, as 
individuals of Hispanic, Oriental, Indian, Eskimo, and Aleut 
descent received benefits under the plan, however, “[t]here 
[was] absolutely no evidence of past discrimination against 
[such people] in any aspect of the Richmond construction 
industry.”37  Such a “random inclusion” of racial groups that 
may never have suffered from discrimination compelled the 
Court to question the veracity of the Richmond plan’s aim of 
remedying past discrimination.38
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s Croson decision 
reiterated and broadened its holding in Korematsu, declaring 
that all races, including whites, constituted a suspect class 
that deserved judicial strict scrutiny.
 
39  While the Court 
quotes Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education40 when stating 
the “ ‘ guarantees of equal protection cannot mean one thing 
when applied to one individual and something else when 
applied to a person of another color,’ ”41
B. Grutter v. Bollinger: Diversity is a Compelling Interest 
 this fundamental 
notion of applying judicial strict scrutiny to race-based 
classifications is derived from Korematsu, a decision made 
over forty years before Wygant. 
The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter 
simultaneously adopted Justice Powell’s diversity view42
 
 36. Id. at 500, 505. 
 in 
Bakke and rendered the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood 
as no longer “good law,” creating for the first time an 
uncontroverted understanding that a university’s interest in 
an ethnically diverse student body can be a compelling 
 37. Id. at 506. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 494. 
 40. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 325 (2003). 
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governmental interest. 43   Unlike Justice Powell’s Bakke 
opinion, which came from a fractured plurality opinion, 
Justice O’Connor’s Grutter opinion commanded a five-to-four 
majority,44 leaving no question as to diversity’s status as a 
compelling interest. 45   At issue in Grutter was a race-
conscious admissions policy implemented by the University of 
Michigan Law School.46  After being denied admission, 
Plaintiff Barbara Grutter, a white female, brought suit 
against the university, claiming the defendant’s admissions 
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.47
Justice O’Connor acknowledged the confusion amongst 
the lower courts with regard to the fractured Bakke opinion, 
stating such courts have “struggled to discern whether 
Justice Powell's diversity rationale, set forth in part of the 
opinion joined by no other Justice, is nonetheless binding 
precedent.”
 
48  After recognizing the ambiguity that 
encompassed the Bakke opinion, however, Justice O’Connor 
cleared away such uncertainty by declaring “today we endorse 
Justice Powell's view that student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.”49
In order to achieve this compelling interest, the Court 
declared that a university’s means must be narrowly tailored 
and may not include racial balancing or use of race as a 
predominant factor for admissions;
 
50 however, a university 
could use race to achieve “critical masses” of 
underrepresented minority students.51  Here, given that the 
University of Michigan Law School’s admissions policy 
considered race “in a flexible, nonmechanical way” and “[did] 
not operate as a quota,”52
 
 43. Id. 
 the Court determined that “the Law 
School’s admissions program [bore] the hallmarks of a 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 314–15. 
 47. Id. at 316–17. 
 48. Id. at 325. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 334. 
 51. Id. at 329–31. 
 52. Id. at 334–35. 
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narrowly tailored plan.”53  Specifically, the Court found that 
the Law School’s admissions policy not only viewed a 
candidate’s race as merely a “plus” factor in admissions 
considerations,54 but its admissions program was “flexible 
enough to ensure that each applicant [was] evaluated as an 
individual and not in a way that [made] an applicant’s race or 
ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.”55  
Additionally, the Court highlighted that the Law School gave 
“substantial weight to diversity factors besides race,” 56 a 
position the majority substantiated by pointing to the Law 
School’s acceptance of “nonminority applicants with grades 
and test scores lower than underrepresented minority 
applicants . . . who are rejected.”57
Justice O’Connor next highlighted the importance of 
deferring to a university’s admissions policies, acknowledging 
the “tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's 
academic decisions.”
 
58  While stating that a university’s race-
based considerations would be subject to review under strict 
scrutiny,59 Justice O’Connor equally emphasized the need to 
give a university freedom to make its own judgments as to the 
selection of its student body,60 and claimed that “ ‘ good faith’ 
on the part of a university is ‘presumed’ absent ‘a showing to 
the contrary.’ ”61  Such deference perturbed Justice Thomas in 
his dissenting opinion, 62  who viewed such 
“unprecedented deference the Court g[ave] to the Law School 
[as] an approach inconsistent with the very concept of ‘strict 
scrutiny.’ ”63
Addressing the subject of less onerous, race-neutral 
alternatives the Law School could have considered, Justice 
O’Connor articulated that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative . . . 
[only] serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
 
 
 53. Id. at 334.  
 54. Id. at 336. 
 55. Id. at 337. 
 56. Id. at 338. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 328. 
 59. Id. at 327. 
 60. Id. at 329. 
 61. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 318–19 (1978)).  
 62. Id. at 387. 
 63. Id. at 350. 
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neutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity the 
university seeks.”64  The Grutter majority held that the Law 
School sufficiently considered race-neutral alternatives, such 
as using a lottery system or decreasing the emphasis on 
LSAT or GPA scores, and determined that requiring the 
implementation of such alternatives “would require a 
dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the academic quality of all 
admitted students, or both.”65
Justice O’Connor ended her Grutter opinion by noting 
there must exist a time when race-based admissions 
considerations will finally end, and claimed the Court 
“expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the 
[diversity] interest approved today.”
  
66
II. FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
  Looking ahead ten 
years to the Fisher case, the possibility exists that race-based 
considerations may cease much earlier than Justice O’Connor 
anticipated. 
After the Fifth Circuit decided Hopwood in 1996, the 
University of Texas at Austin (UT) was prohibited from using 
race in determining student admissions,67 a policy that was 
practiced by the university prior to that decision.68  The Texas 
legislature attempted to mitigate the effects of Hopwood by 
passing Texas House Bill 588 in 1997,69 better known as the 
“Top Ten Percent Law,” which guaranteed Texas students 
who graduate in the top ten percent of their high school 
automatic admission to any Texas-funded university.70  The 
Top Ten Percent Law did not admit students on the basis of 
race, but under-represented minorities were its announced 
target demographic.71 When the Supreme Court handed down 
its Grutter opinion in 2003, Hopwood became bad law, 
prompting UT to reevaluate its admissions process.72
 
 64. Id. at 339. 
 
 65. Id. at 340. 
 66. Id. at 343. 
 67. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 68. Id. at 222. 
 69. Id. at 224. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 224–25. 
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During the reevaluation of UT’s admissions process, the 
university conducted two studies to determine whether it had 
enrolled a critical mass of under-represented minorities.73  
The findings of these two studies revealed ninety percent of 
small-sized classes (classes with between five and twenty-four 
total students enrolled) had one or zero African-American 
students enrolled and forty-three percent of such classes had 
one or zero Hispanic students.74  Additionally, UT’s findings 
revealed that minority students “reported feeling isolated,”75 
and that a majority of the student body felt there was 
“ ‘ insufficient minority representation in classrooms for the 
full benefits of diversity to occur.’ ”76
Citing these diversity studies, UT determined the 
university “had not yet achieved the critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students needed to obtain the full 
educational benefits of diversity,”
 
77 and consequentially added 
the consideration of race as one additional factor within its 
admissions process. 78
Abigail Fisher is a white female who was denied 
admission into UT’s undergraduate program.
  This new admissions policy is the 
impetus for the current Fisher controversy. 
79   After 
discovering the university’s policy of considering race in its 
admissions process, 80  Fisher brought suit claiming the 
university violated her rights against racial discrimination 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.81  The district court ruled in favor of UT,82 
stating, “as long as Grutter remains good law, UT's current 
admissions program remains constitutional.”83  On appeal to 
the Fifth Circuit, a three-panel opinion affirmed the district 
court’s ruling;84
 
 73. Id. at 225. 
 however, Judge Garza authored a scathing 
concurrence criticizing Grutter’s consistency with general 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 226. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 217. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 613 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 215 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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constitutional jurisprudence.85
A. Judge Higginbotham’s Opinion 
 
Judge Higginbotham authored the opinion in Fisher’s 
appeal and ultimately concluded that UT’s admissions policy 
was consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence.86  Stating 
that UT’s efforts to obtain a critical mass of minority students 
constituted “a compelling state interest that can justify the 
use of race in university admissions,” 87  Higginbotham 
declared UT’s “decision to reintroduce race-conscious 
admissions was adequately supported by . . . Grutter.”88  The 
Fifth Circuit declared that UT’s admissions policy deserved 
judicial deference on two independent grounds: first, UT’s 
academic decisions “are a product of ‘complex educational 
judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise 
of the university,’ far outside the experience of the courts;”89 
and second, a university’s selection of its student body is 
entitled to First Amendment protection.90
Judge Higginbotham’s opinion also focused on the 
Supreme Court’s 2007 affirmative action decision in Parents 
Involved v. Seattle School District,
 
91 stating that Parents 
Involved supports the Court’s position in Grutter requiring “a 
measure of deference to [a] university’s good faith 
determination that certain race-conscious measures are 
necessary to achieve the educational benefits of diversity . . . 
so long as a university considers race in a holistic and 
individualized manner, and not as part of a quota or fixed-
point system.”92
 
 85. Id. at 247. 
  Instead of interpreting the Parents Involved 
decision as requiring school districts to support their 
affirmative action plans with specific evidence, Judge 
Higginbotham held the Court struck down the school 
districts' programs only “because they pursued racial 
balancing and defined students based on racial group 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 219 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,325 (2003)). 
 88. Id. at 247. 
 89. Id. at 231 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007). 
 92. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 233 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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classifications, not on individual circumstances.” 93   
Ultimately, Judge Higginbotham held that even after Parents 
Involved, the Court “ha[d] not retreated from Grutter's mode 
of analysis, one tailored to holistic university admissions 
programs,” and thus determined that a deferential strict 
scrutiny standard should be applied to race-conscious 
admissions policies in higher education.94  To substantiate 
this position that Parents Involved merely proscribed “binary 
racial categories to classify schoolchildren,”95 Judge 
Higginbotham specifically addressed Justice Kennedy’s 
Parents Involved concurrence, stating “Justice Kennedy . . . 
wrote separately to clarify that ‘a more nuanced, individual 
evaluation . . . informed by Grutter’ would be permissible, 
even for small gains sought by the school districts.”96
Despite the requisite strict scrutiny analysis that must 
be overcome before a governmental entity may utilize race-
based discrimination, the Fifth Circuit determined that strict 
scrutiny’s “narrow-tailoring inquiry . . . [must be] undertaken 
with a degree of deference to the University's constitutionally 
protected, presumably expert academic judgment.”
 
97 Thus, 
under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Grutter, strict 
scrutiny serves as a faux barrier, requiring the court “give a 
degree of deference” to a university’s race-based admissions 
policy and examine only whether that policy was adopted in 
good faith,98 and the courts must “presume the University 
acted in good faith.”99
B. Judge Garza’s Dissenting Concurrence 
 
In Judge Garza’s concurrence, while agreeing that Judge 
Higginbotham’s opinion correctly adhered to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Grutter,100
 
 93. Id. at 234. 
 Garza vehemently disagreed 
with the Court’s Grutter decision, arguing the case 
“represents a digression in the course of constitutional 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 246. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 232. 
 98. Id. at 231–32. 
 99. Id. at 231.  
 100. Id. at 247. 
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law.”101  Judge Garza reasoned that the deference the courts 
must give to a university’s race-based considerations is 
antithetical to the fundamental notions of strict scrutiny,102 
and claimed Grutter inappropriately “redefined the meaning 
of [strict scrutiny’s] narrow tailoring.”103  By requiring courts 
to “simply assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
that university administrators have acted in good faith in 
pursuing racial diversity,” 104  Judge Garza argued that a 
university’s admissions policy escapes any “meaningful 
judicial review under any level of scrutiny.”105
Unlike Judge Higginbotham’s lead opinion, Judge 
Garza’s concurrence only briefly addressed the Parents 
Involved case and its applicability to the present controversy.  
As opposed to distinguishing Grutter from Parents Involved, 
Judge Garza begrudgingly acquiesced that despite the Court’s 
Parents Involved opinion, the principles articulated in Grutter 
remain valid, stating: “[t]oday we follow Grutter’s lead . . . 
[and] despite my belief that
 
 Grutter represents a digression in 
the course of constitutional law, today's opinion is a faithful, 
if unfortunate, application of that misstep.”106  Judge Garza 
acknowledged Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved 
concurrence only to substantiate her position that UT’s race-
based admissions policy should fail strict scrutiny, 
highlighting Justice Kennedy articulation that “ ‘ [i]ndividual 
racial classifications . . . may be considered legitimate only if 
they are a last resort to achieve a compelling interest.’ ”107
Despite Justice Kennedy’s Parents Involved position, 
Judge Garza emphasized the feebleness of narrow tailoring in 
a post-Grutter world, stating: 
 
[N]arrow tailoring in the university admissions context is 
not about balancing constitutional costs and benefits any 
longer.  
 
 101. Id. 
Post-Grutter, universities need not inflict the least 
harm possible so long as they operate in good faith.  And 
in assessing good faith, institutions like the University of 
Texas need not even provide the type of metrics that allow 
 102. Id. at 248. 
 103. Id. at 249. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 247. 
 107. Id. at 263 (quoting Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 790 (2006)) (emphasis in original). 
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courts to review their affirmative action programs . . . In 
the world post-Grutter, courts are enjoined to take 
universities at their word.108
Such language echoes Justice Kennedy’s dissent in 
Grutter, where he claimed “[t]he Court confuses deference to 
a university's definition of its educational objective with 
deference to the implementation of this goal. In the context of 
university admissions . . . deference is not to be given with 
respect to the methods by which [racial diversity] is 
pursued.”
 
109
Judge Garza also challenged the assumed benefits of 
diversity as speculative and conjectural,
  Given that Justice Kennedy helped decide 
Fisher, Justice Kennedy’s and Judge Garza’s criticism of the 
deference due to a university’s race-based admissions policy is 
especially significant. 
110 and stated that 
Grutter’s majority opinion “rests almost entirely on intuitive 
appeal rather than concrete evidence.”111  Arguing that strict 
scrutiny is designed to protect against such intuitive appeal, 
Judge Garza emphasized that Grutter’s holding is 
paradoxical.112  On one hand, the Court held that diversity 
was necessary to eradicate the notion that minority students 
think and behave, not as individuals, but as a race; however, 
at the same time, the Grutter Court approved a policy that 
operates on the assumption that racial status correlates with 
greater diversity of viewpoints. 113   The Equal Protection 
Clause, Judge Garza wrote, forbids such stereotypical 
assumptions, which create the inference that “members of 
minority groups, because of their racial status, are likely to 
have unique experiences and perspectives.”114  Under Judge 
Garza’s perspective, Grutter significantly deflated strict 
scrutiny’s applicability to a university’s race-based 
considerations, inappropriately granted deference to such 
educational policies, and signified a grave misstep in the 
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence.115
 
 108. Id. 
 
 109. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003). 
 110. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 255–56. 
 111. Id. at 255. 
 112. Id. at 256. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 266. 
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C. Oral Arguments Before The United States Supreme Court 
On February 21, 2012, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to decide on the Fisher controversy. 116   
Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from hearing the case, 
having been involved in her previous capacity as U.S. 
Solicitor General in the Obama Administration’s submission 
of a brief supporting the University of Texas when Fisher’s 
case was before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.117  On 
October 10, 2012, the Court heard oral arguments from the 
parties.  During oral arguments, before the attorney for 
petitioner Abigail Fisher could even articulate the issue 
presented before the Court, Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor 
raised piercing questions regarding standing.118  Specifically, 
the Justices questioned Ms. Fisher’s ability to satisfy the 
injury requirement to confer standing, citing contention that 
Ms. Fisher would have been rejected from the University of 
Texas at Austin, whether or not her race was considered.119  
Additionally, Justice Sotomayor expressed doubt over the 
measure of relief sought by Ms. Fisher, pointing out that 
because Ms. Fisher had already graduated from another 
college, injunctive relief would be inappropriate.120
Seemingly defending Ms. Fisher’s ability to satisfy the 
requirements of standing, Justice Scalia posited that the 
denial of Ms. Fisher’s equal protection rights constituted 
sufficient injury to confer standing, stating, “[w]e’ve had cases 
involving alleged discrimination in state—state contracting.  
And we haven’t required the person who was discriminated 
against because of race to prove that he would have gotten 
the contract otherwise . . . it’s been enough that there was a 
denial of equal protection.”
 
121
 
 116. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
  Additionally, Justice Scalia 
noted that Ms. Fisher suffered a monetary injury by paying to 
have her admissions application considered, when the 
 117. Ralph K.M. Haurwitz, UT’s Race-Conscious Admission Policy Facing 
Supreme Court Test, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN (Feb. 21, 2012), http:// 
www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/uts-race-conscious-
admission-policy-facing-supreme/nRkgH/. 
 118. Transcript of Oral Argument at 3–6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (No. 11–345). 
 119. Id. at 3–4. 
 120. Id. at 5. 
 121. Id. at 7. 
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admission measures utilized were unfair.122
After the initial standing issue was discussed, Bert Rein, 
counsel for Ms. Fisher, argued that the University of Texas 
failed to apply Grutter’s holding and consider whether a 
critical mass of minority students could be generated without 
resorting to race-based considerations.
  Based on these 
considerations, Justice Scalia firmly held that the 
constitutional injuries suffered by Ms. Fisher were sufficient 
to confer standing. 
123  Mr. Rein also called 
upon the court to restate the “critical mass” principle 
articulated in Grutter, asserting that the vagueness inherent 
such language “a flaw . . . in Grutter.”124  Alluding to strict 
scrutiny’s “narrowly-tailored” requirement, Mr. Reid argued 
that because the term “critical mass” is an unknown element 
left to the opinion of any university, a determination of 
“critical mass” eludes narrow-tailoring, stating, “you can’t 
tailor to the unknown.  If you have no range of evaluation, if 
you have no understanding of what critical mass means, you 
can’t tailor to it.”125
The subject of critical mass was a heavily scrutinized 
question when counsel for the University of Texas, Gregory 
Garre, approached the Court.
 
126   Chief Justice Roberts 
pressed Mr. Garre on the University of Texas’ critical mass 
goals, asking, if the university is unable to articulate what 
constitutes a critical mass, “how are we supposed to tell 
whether [the university’s] plan is narrowly tailored to that 
goal?”127  The justices focused heavily on the subjectivity and 
opaqueness surrounding the determination of “critical mass,” 
urging Mr. Garre to express the appropriate standard to 
apply when determining whether such a critical mass had 
been attained. 128   Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, who 
appeared in defense of the university’s program, attempted to 
minimize the actual significance of critical mass, stating that 
critical mass cannot be reduced to a number,129
 
 122. Id. at 7–8. 
 and that “the 
 123. Id. at 13. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 19. 
 126. Id. at 33–35. 
 127. Id. at 39. 
 128. Id. at 49. 
 129. Id. at 69. 
4_BLEA FINAL.docx 4/18/2014  7:35 PM 
2013] AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1101 
idea of critical mass has taken on a life of its own in a way 
that's not helpful because it doesn't focus the inquiry where it 
should be.”130
D. The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Fisher 
 
When the Court decided Fisher on June 24, 2013, an 
unexpected six of the eight deciding Justices joined in the 
majority opinion.  Justices Thomas, who filed a concurrence, 
and Ginsburg, who dissented from the majority, were the only 
Justices who did not join. Perhaps expectantly, while Justices 
from both the Court’s conservative and liberal blocs all 
managed to agree on Fisher’s ruling, the ultimate decision left 
Grutter’s precedent largely unchanged. 
Delivering the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy 
admonished the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, holding the “Court of 
Appeals confined the strict scrutiny inquiry in too narrow a 
way by deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of 
racial classifications.”131  According to Justice Kennedy, such 
a “good faith” deferential standard departed from the 
standard articulated in Grutter, stating, “Grutter did not hold 
that good faith would forgive an impermissible consideration 
of race . . . Strict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a 
school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a 
permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the 
evidence of how the process works in practice.”132  Noting the 
unique context of higher education, the majority opinion 
stated that “[t]he higher education dynamic does not change 
the narrow tailoring analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in 
other contexts.” 133
One especially significant notion Justice Kennedy 
articulated was describing the circumstances under which a 
university’s “diversity objectives” were to be approached 
deferentially: “Grutter calls for deference to the University’s 
  Given this fact, the Fifth’s Circuit’s 
interpretation of Grutter as showing deference to a 
University’s diversity objectives, was in error, as such racially 
based decisions must be subjected to the full force and effect 
of strict scrutiny. 
 
 130. Id. at 72. 
 131. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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conclusion [that] based on its experience and expertise, a 
diverse student body would serve its educational goals.”134   
While a university’s decision that increased diversity would 
strengthen its campus constitutes “an academic judgment to 
which some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper,” 
the implementation of that academic judgment must be 
tested by the full extent of strict scrutiny. 135   Stated 
differently, once a university implements an admissions 
process to achieve its goal of diversity, “[t]he University must 
prove that the means chosen by the University to attain 
diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal.  On this point, 
the University receives no deference.”136
Summarily stating the Court’s holding, and recounting 
the strict scrutiny argument articulated in his Grutter 
dissent, Justice Kennedy cautioned that while strict scrutiny 
must not be strict in theory, but fatal in fact: 
 
“[so must] strict scrutiny not be strict in theory but feeble 
in fact.  In order for judicial review to be meaningful, a 
university must make a showing that its plan is narrowly 
tailored to achieve the only interest that this Court has 
approved in this context: the benefits of a student body 
diversity that “encompasses a . . . broa[d] array of 
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic 
origin is but a single though important element.”137
Ultimately, Fisher did not weaken Grutter or change the 
foundation of affirmative action; instead, Fisher further 
clarified Grutter, underscoring when deference should be 
given, and elucidating the idea that higher education is not 
exempt from the full force of strict scrutiny. 
 
III. SEPARATING FISHER FROM GRUTTER 
While Judge Garza and multiple Supreme Court justices 
would have liked to see Grutter overruled, the facts 
separating Fisher from Grutter were dissimilar enough to 
allow the Court to rule on Fisher without overruling its 
previous precedent.  Despite the fact that several of the 
justices expressed resentment over the holding in Grutter, the 
 
 134. Id. at 2419 (quotations omitted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 2419–20. 
 137. Id. at 2421 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315). 
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Court has previously emphasized that “a decision to overrule 
[a previous Supreme Court decision] should rest on some 
special reason over and above the belief that a prior case was 
wrongly decided.”138
A. Contextual Distinction 
  Thus, in order to avoid concocting a 
“special reason” as to why Grutter should be overruled, the 
Court could have simply concentrated on one of a number of 
meaningful differences that distinguished Fisher from 
Grutter. 
When Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in 
Grutter, she repeatedly emphasized that “[c]ontext matters 
when reviewing race-based governmental action under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”139  Justice O’Connor stressed 
that “[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable,” 140  and that while strict scrutiny must 
strenuously examine the reasons advanced for race-based 
preferences, such scrutiny must also consider the particular 
context under which such preferences exist.141
The dissimilarities between Grutter and Fisher are 
significant, and the Court could have logically regarded 
Grutter as nonbinding on the Fisher case.  First, in Grutter, 
race-based preferences were implemented at a top tier law 
school,
  Given the 
importance of “context” to Grutter’s ultimate decision, the 
Court in Fisher could have accentuated the differences 
between the two cases in order to place Fisher in a wholly 
different framework (undergraduate university vs. 
prestigious law school), allowing the Court to rule on Fisher 
without deciding whether to overrule Grutter. 
142 whereas in Fisher the circumstances encompassed 
admission into an undergraduate program. 143   Justice 
O’Connor emphasized in Grutter that law schools “represent 
the training ground for a large number of [the] Nation’s 
leaders,”144
 
 138. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992). 
 and further claimed that this was particularly 
 139. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 312. 
 143. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 144. Id. at 332. 
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true for “highly selective law schools.” 145   Further 
accentuating the uniqueness of the law school environment, 
Justice O’Connor maintained that in a heterogeneous society, 
“[a]ccess to legal education . . . must be inclusive of talented 
and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity.”146
Given the attention the Court showed to the idiosyncratic 
context of the top tier law school, the Fisher Court could have 
simply stated that Grutter’s ruling is extremely narrow and 
applied only in the context of prestigious and highly selective 
academic programs.  Regardless of the fact that the 
University of Texas’s undergraduate program is highly 
regarded, the Court could have highlighted the vastly 
different context of the law school environment and 
effectively made Grutter inapplicable to the Fisher 
controversy. 
 
The Court could have emphasized the significance of this 
contextual difference in Fisher by pointing to its decision in 
Parents Involved, where the majority conceded in Part III(A) 
that diversity could be a compelling state interest “ ‘ in the 
context of higher education’ . . . [so long as it is] not focused on 
race alone but encompasse[s] ‘all factors that may contribute 
to student body diversity.’ ”147  The Parents Involved Court 
additionally emphasized that Grutter “repeatedly noted that 
it was addressing the use of race ‘in the context of higher 
education,’ ” and that Grutter’s ultimate ruling “relied upon 
considerations unique to institutions of higher education, 
noting that in light of ‘the expansive freedoms of speech and 
thought associated with the university environment, 
universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional 
tradition.’ ”148  The majority in Part III(A) even explicitly 
distinguished Grutter from the Parents Involved controversy, 
stating “[t]he present cases are not governed by  
Grutter,”149 a position that earned Justice Kennedy’s decisive 
fifth vote.150
 
 145. Id. 
  Using this language from Parents Involved, the 
 146. Id. 
 147. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 551 U.S. 701, 
722 (2007) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328, 337 (2003)) 
(emphasis added). 
 148. Id. at 724–25 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327–29, 334) (emphasis 
added). 
 149. Id. at 725. 
 150. Id. at 782. 
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Court in Fisher could have further narrowed the “higher 
education” exception, holding that Grutter’s authorization of 
race-based considerations was restricted to graduate school 
programs, or perhaps even to top tier graduate programs 
equivalent in reputation to the University of Michigan. 
A second dissimilarity between Fisher and Grutter that 
the Court could have seized upon is the subtle differences in 
their contested application processes.  With this information, 
the Court could have analogized how UT’s race-conscious 
admissions process was akin to the unconstitutional 
measures enacted in Parents Involved.  Unlike Grutter’s 
program, which “focused on each applicant as an individual, 
and not simply as a member of a particular racial group”151 
the Parents Involved majority determined the Seattle 
diversity program considered race as “not simply one factor 
weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; 
[but] the factor.”152  The Court in Fisher could have ultimately 
held that, similar to Parents United, UT’s race-based 
admissions objective of “un-clustering minority students from 
certain programs”153
B. Excessive Deference and Improper Measures 
 simply placed too much weight on an 
applicant’s race during the admissions process, exceeding the 
bounds of that which is tolerable under Grutter. 
When the Fifth Circuit decided Fisher, Judge 
Higginbotham wrote that strict scrutiny’s narrow-tailoring 
inquiry must be made “with a degree of deference to the 
University’s . . . presumably expert opinion,”154 requiring a 
court to examine only whether a race-based admissions policy 
was adopted in good faith.155
 
 144. Id. at 722. 
  Comparing the facts of UT’s 
admissions policy with those approved of in Grutter, Judge 
Higginbotham emphasized that, post-Grutter, a university’s 
use of race-conscious admissions criteria to promote diversity 
is permissible “if it contemplates that a broad range of 
qualities and experiences beyond race will be important 
contributions to diversity and as such are appropriately 
 152. Id. at 723. 
 153. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 154. Id. at 232. 
 155. Id. at 231. 
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considered in admissions decisions.”156
Similar to the criteria used by the Law School in Grutter, 
Judge Higginbotham observed that  
 
[n]one of the elements of [UT’s admissions policy]—
including race—are considered individually or given 
separate numerical values to be added together.  Rather, 
the file is evaluated as a whole in order to provide the 
fullest possible understanding of the student as a person 
and to place his or her achievements in context.157
Holding that UT’s admissions program was directly identical 
with the policy approved of in Grutter, Judge Higginbotham 
agreed with the lower court’s determination that “[i]f the 
Plaintiffs are right, Grutter
   
 is wrong.”158
Additionally, Judge Higginbotham emphasized that 
Grutter required the courts to presume a university acted 
with good faith when enacting such policies.
 
159   Given this 
tremendous allocation of deference, the Court could have 
criticized the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Grutter as an 
overextension of the deference afforded to a university’s 
implementation of race-based considerations.  Whereas 
Grutter specifically afforded deference to a university’s 
academic decisions, the Court could have tightly constricted 
the applicability of such deference, claiming that Grutter only 
stated deference be granted to a university’s determination 
that diversity is essential to its educational goals.160
To further substantiate this notion, while the Grutter 
majority held that deference is owed to the “educational 
judgment that . . . diversity is essential to [a school’s] 
educational mission,”
   Thus, 
while such a determination deserves deference, the means by 
which to attain that end may not merit similar deference. 
161 the Court specifically stated that the 
methods implemented to attain that asserted interest would 
be bound by “constitutionally prescribed limit[ations].”162
 
 156. Id. at 221. 
  The 
Court could have stated that the Fifth Circuit misapplied the 
 157. Id. at 228. 
 158. Id. at 218 n.9 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 612–
13 (W.D. Tex 2009). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 161. Id. (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. 
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deference afforded a university’s race based considerations as 
stated in Grutter, and ultimately hold that the policy did in 
fact exceed the “constitutionally prescribed limitations” that 
decision permitted. 
The Court could have also criticized the measures UT 
used to determine whether it had attained a “critical mass” of 
underrepresented minority students on its campus.163  While 
UT’s “critical mass” study revealed that ninety percent of its 
smaller sized classes had one or fewer African-American 
students enrolled,164 the Court had the opportunity to assert 
that, under Grutter, the proper basis for measuring “critical 
mass” is the diversity of the student body as a whole, 165  and 
thus does not require that every classroom have a minimum 
number of minority students. 166   Given that Justice 
O’Connor’s majority opinion in Grutter specifically stated that 
“the Law School sought to . . . achieve student body diversity 
[as a whole],”167
Additionally, Judge Higginbotham’s decision compared 
UT’s “critical mass” measures with Grutter’s permitted 
measures numerous times, stating 
 the Court could have distinguished UT’s 
classroom-by-classroom “critical mass” analysis as an 
overextension of Grutter. 
[l]ike the law school in Grutter, UT “has determined, 
based on its experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ 
of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further its 
compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of 
a diverse student body.”  UT has made an ” educational 
judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational 
mission,” just as Michigan's Law School did in Grutter.168   
 
 163. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 225. 
The Supreme Court in Fisher had the opportunity to 
determine that the Fifth Circuit misapplied Grutter’s 
 164. Id. 
 165. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (“In announcing the principle of student body 
diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell invoked our cases 
recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of 
educational autonomy: ‘The freedom of a university to make its own judgments 
as to education includes the selection of its student body.’ ”). 
 166. Id. at 325 (“[W]e endorse Justice Powell's view that student body 
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in 
university admissions.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 230–31 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 
2d 587, 603 (W.D. Tex. 2009). 
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justification for seeking a critical mass of underrepresented 
minority students and hold that Grutter’s “critical masses” 
tolerance is only applicable if the university “adequately 
consider[s] race-neutral alternatives currently capable of 
producing a critical mass without forcing the [university] to 
abandon . . . academic selectivity.”169  Additionally, the Court 
could have held that Texas’s Top Ten Percent program 
constituted such a race-neutral alternative capable of 
producing a critical mass of underrepresented minority 
students, and thus conclude that the Fifth Circuit 
misinterpreted Grutter as tolerating UT’s efforts to attain 
“critical masses” of minority students despite the availability 
of a reasonable race-neutral alternative. 
The Court could have also looked to their Parents 
Involved decision to determine that the means UT’s 
admissions policy utilized to attain its critical mass of 
underrepresented minority students did not survive strict 
scrutiny.  In Parents Involved, the majority opinion stated, 
“[o]ur established strict scrutiny test for racial classifications 
. . . insists on ‘detailed examination, both as to ends and as to 
means,’ ”170 and ultimately held that “using means that treat 
students solely as members of a racial group is fundamentally 
[unconstitutional].” 171   Additionally, Justice Kennedy’s 
Parents Involved concurrence emphasized that “individual 
racial classification employed [to avoid racial isolation] may 
be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to 
achieve a compelling interest.”172  In light of these opinions, 
given that UT’s “critical mass” studies cited racial isolation as 
a substantiating factor for their admissions program, 173  and 
considering the alleged effectiveness of Texas’s race-neutral 
Top Ten Percent Law,174
 
 169. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. 
 the Court could have labeled UT’s 
race-based considerations as superfluous, and could have 
ultimately held that the policy fails to satisfy strict scrutiny’s 
narrow-tailoring requirement. 
 170. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
743 (2007) (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 515 U.S. 200, 236 
(1995)). 
 171. Id. at 733. 
 172. Id. at 790. 
 173. Fisher, 631 F. 3d at 225. 
 174. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 306 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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C. Race-Neutral Alternatives and Diverging Outcomes 
Before a governmental entity may enact “legal 
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group,”175 strict scrutiny requires such restrictions be justified 
by a compelling governmental interest, 176  and those 
restrictions must be narrowly tailored to achieve that 
compelling interest.177  However, even if both of these criteria 
are satisfied, if there exists a racially-neutral alternative to 
achieving that same compelling interest, such a 
discriminatory curtailment will not satisfy the strict scrutiny 
standard.178  In Fisher, the Court had the opportunity look to 
Texas’s racially neutral Top Ten Percent Law, which has 
allowed “unprecedentedly high numbers . . . of preferred 
minorities” to gain admission to UT,179
While the Court has held that “[n]arrow tailoring does 
not require the exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral 
alternative,”
 and conclude that the 
University’s race-conscious admissions policy was 
unnecessarily superfluous to attaining the necessary “critical 
mass” of underrepresented minority students. 
180  it does require “serious, good faith 
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will 
achieve the diversity [a] university seeks.”181  The Court in 
Fisher could have maintained that Texas’s Top Ten Percent 
Law is such a workable race-neutral alternative to UT’s 
current race-based admissions program, and further decide 
that the admissions policy was unconstitutional not because 
Grutter was wrongly decided, but because the University 
unnecessarily implemented a racially conscious measure 
beyond an effective race-neutral alternative.182
Texas’s race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law requires that 
“each [public university] admit an applicant for admission to 
the institution as an undergraduate student if the applicant 
graduated [from a public Texas high school] with a grade 
 
 
 175. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
 176. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
783 (2007). 
 177. Id. at 720. 
 178. Id. at 735. 
 179. Fisher, 644 F.3d at 306. 
 180. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Tex. Educ. Code § 51.803 (West, Westlaw through 2013). 
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point average in the top 10 percent of the student’s high 
school graduating class.”183  At the University of Texas at 
Austin, the site central to the Fisher controversy, the 
admissions policy first separates its applicants into two 
separate groups, “(1) Texas residents who are in the top ten 
percent of their high school class and (2) those Texas 
residents who are not.”184  Abigail Fisher falls into the latter 
group.185
While students in the top ten percent of their high school 
class are guaranteed admission to the University of Texas at 
Austin, applicants not within the top ten percent of their 
class compete for admission based on an Academic and 
Personal Achievement Index (PAI), a “mechanical formula 
that predicts freshman GPA using standardized test scores 
and high school class rank.”
 
186  An applicant’s PAI is based on 
two required essays and a “personal achievement score, which 
represents an evaluation of the applicant’s entire file.”187  
This personal achievement score is assigned by “assessing an 
applicant's demonstrated leadership qualities, awards and 
honors, work experience, and involvement in extracurricular 
activities and community service . . . [as well as] the 
socioeconomic status of the applicant and . . . the applicant's 
race.”188 
“None of the elements of the personal achievement 
score—including race—are considered individually;” rather, 
“the file is evaluated as a whole in order to provide the fullest 
possible understanding of the student as a person.”189
Despite the existence of the alternative race-neutral, Top 
Ten Percent Law, Grutter emphasized that satisfying strict 
  The 
Court could have determined that, given the effectiveness of 
Texas’s race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law, UT’s personal 
achievement score was an unnecessary race-based 
consideration that needed to exclude the significance of an 
applicant’s ethnicity. 
 
 183. Id. § 51.803(a). 
 184. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 227. 
 185. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 590, 594–95 (W.D. Tex. 
2009). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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scrutiny “does not require exhaustion of every conceivable 
race-neutral alternative . . . [but merely] require[s] serious, 
good faith consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives 
that will achieve the diversity the university seeks.”190  The 
Fifth Circuit’s opinion confirmed this position, holding that 
the existence of race-neutral alternatives will not cause a 
race-conscious policy to fail a narrow-tailoring analysis.191
Even assuming that UT could have surpassed the strict 
scrutiny hurdle, the Court has previously held if a race-
conscious program with the goal of promoting diversity has 
only a “minimal impact” on attaining such diversity, such 
nominal gains “cast[] doubt on the necessity of using racial 
classifications.”
  
Nevertheless, the Court could have held that the effectiveness 
and the prior existence of the race-neutral Top Ten Percent 
Law renders UT’s admissions policy superfluous, and 
therefore was not sufficiently narrowly-tailored to survive 
strict scrutiny. 
192  Unlike the race-based admissions policy at 
issue in Grutter, which more than tripled minority 
representation at the law school,193 the “additional diversity 
contribution of [UT]’s race-conscious admissions program is 
tiny.”194  Despite not being as effective as Grutter’s policy, the 
Court could have determined that UT’s race-conscious 
admissions policy is necessary even in light of Texas’s race-
neutral Top Ten Percent Law, for “[w]hile the Law may have 
contributed to an increase in overall minority enrollment, 
those minority students remain clustered in certain 
programs, limiting the beneficial effects of educational 
diversity.”195
Additionally, the Court had the opportunity to criticize 
UT’s attempt to remedy “minority students . . . clustered in 
  But regardless of this argument, the Court 
could have also simply regarded UT’s admissions program as 
ineffective when compared to the admissions program at 
issue in Grutter. 
 
 190. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S 306, 339 (2003). 
 191. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 238. 
 192. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
734 (2007). 
 193. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 644 F.3d 301, 304 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 194. Id. at 307. 
 195. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 240. 
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certain programs”196 using its decision in Parents Involved, 
for, by seeking diversity through “un-clustering” minority 
students from certain programs, UT’s diversity justifications 
consider the students’ race standing alone.  Similar to the 
Court’s criticism of the school district in Parents Involved, 
through UT’s attempts to racially diversify its programs and 
classrooms, “[race] is not simply one factor weighed with 
others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; [but] 
is the factor.”197
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUPREME COURT’S POST-
GRUTTER COMPOSITION 
 
When the Supreme Court decided Grutter in 2003, the 
majority opinion passed by a narrow five-to-four margin.198  
But, in the ten years since that decision, the Court’s 
composition has undergone a critical transformation.  Of the 
five justices who voted with the majority in Grutter, only two 
of the five justices remain on the Court today, whereas three 
of the four dissenters in Grutter remain.199
 
  Nevertheless, 
despite the addition of four new justices, the majority of those 
justices are ideologically akin to the justices that they 
replaced, one notable exception being the conservative Justice 
Alito’s replacement of Justice O’Connor, who authored the 
majority opinion in Grutter.  This lack of substantial change 
to the Court’s ideological composition made the task of 
speculating on how the Court would handle the affirmative 
action question presented in Fisher less opaque; however, the 
combination of Justice Alito’s presence and Justice Kennedy’s 
unique perspective on affirmative action significantly 
complicated the matter.  Based on such complications, to 
understand Justices Kennedy’s and Alito’s view in Fisher, it 
is valuable to look back on their prior decisions that 
encompassed the area of affirmative action. 
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 723. 
 198. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 310 (2003). 
 199. Id. (O’Connor, Stevens Souter Ginsburg, and Bryer formed the majority; 
while Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia Thomas formed the minority.). 
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A. Parents Involved and the Future of Affirmative Action 
The controversy in Parents Involved concerned a school 
district’s use of a race-based admissions program to promote 
diversity amongst the district’s varying schools.200  If the 
racial demographics of any school’s student body deviated by 
more than a predetermined percentage, race was considered 
to determine whether admission would be granted to 
incoming students.201  Under this policy, a particular school 
could favor either white or non-white students for admission 
depending on which race would bring the racial balance closer 
to the predetermined goal.202
While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld this 
race-based admissions program as valid under Grutter, the 
Supreme Court reversed, claiming that the Seattle School 
District’s program amounted to unconstitutional racial 
balancing.
 
203   The majority noted, with Justice Kennedy 
providing the critical fifth vote in Part III(A), that the Court’s 
approval of the race-based admissions policy in Grutter 
“relied upon considerations unique to institutions of higher 
education . . . [and] repeatedly noted that it was addressing 
the use of race ‘in the context of higher education.’ ” 204   
Distinguishing the controversy even further from Grutter, in 
the final sentence of Part III(A), the majority candidly 
emphasized that the Parents Involved case was “not governed 
by Grutter.”205
As evidenced by the majority’s emphatic efforts to 
distinguish Parents Involved from Grutter in the last sentence 
of Part III(A),
 
206 Parents Involved did not overrule Grutter; 
however, it notably narrowed the case’s diversity ruling and 
constituted an unequivocal blow to the future of race-based 
considerations.207
 
 200. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712. 
  In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice 
Breyer articulated this narrowing of Grutter, arguing that the 
Court’s application of equally strict scrutiny to all racial 
classifications, no matter whether the classifications seek to 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 729. 
 204. Id. at 724–25 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003)). 
 205. Id. at 725. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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include or exclude, 208  contradicts Grutter’s position that 
“ ‘ [n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable.’ ”209  Additionally, Justice Breyer argued that 
such equality of scrutiny ignored the significance of “context” 
in the Grutter decision, for, by evenhandedly applying 
scrutiny to all race-based classifications, no matter the 
circumstances, the Court is consequently ignoring contextual 
nuances.210
While affirmative action policies continue to be 
implemented post-Parents Involved, the Court may declare 
diversity’s status as a compelling governmental interest is 
only applicable to the unique context of higher education.
 
211  
Of the five current Supreme Court justices who voted with 
the majority in Parents Involved, Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Kennedy all dissented in Grutter; however, given his 
position constituted the crucial fifth vote to secure a majority 
opinion, it is significant that Justice Kennedy only joined 
Parts I, II, III(A), and III(C) of Chief Justice Roberts’ Parents 
Involved decision.  The two remaining justices who voted with 
the Parents Involved majority, Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Alito, while appointed after Grutter, have nonetheless 
expressed particular abhorrence for the affirmative action 
principles expressed and condoned in Grutter. 212   Chief 
Justice Roberts in particular bluntly articulated this 
oppositional viewpoint in the final sentence of his Parents 
Involved opinion, stating “[t]he way to stop discrimination on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”213
While four of the Court’s current justices appear 
ideologically opposed to affirmative action (Justices Alito, 
Thomas, Scalia, and Chief Justice Roberts), Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer have consistently voted in favor of such 
race-based considerations.  Both justices agreed with the 
majority in Grutter
 
214
 
 208. Id. at 832. 
 and dissented from the Court’s Parents 
 209. Id. at 833 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003)). 
 210. Id. at 834. 
 211. Id. at 725. 
 212. Id. at 748. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310. 
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Involved decision.215  In fact, Justice Breyer was so opposed to 
the majority opinion in Parents Involved that he pointedly 
spoke from the bench for more than twenty minutes, decrying 
that “[i]t is not often in the law that so few have so quickly 
changed so much.”216
Justices Stevens and Souter each agreed with the 
majority in Grutter and dissented from the Court’s narrowing 
of Grutter in Parents Involved, claiming that “in light of 
Grutter” strict scrutiny of race-conscious admissions policies 
only requires a judge to inquire into “whether the school 
boards . . . adopted these plans to serve a ‘compelling 
governmental interest’ and, if so, whether the plans are 
‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve that interest.”
  Based on Justice Breyer’s and Justice 
Ginsburg’s previous endorsement of race-based 
considerations to promote diversity, it was anticipated that 
both justices will be in favor of UT’s admissions policy and 
thus vote to affirm the Fifth Circuit’s ruling.  Defying such 
expectations, however, Justice Breyer joined the majority 
opinion criticizing the Fifth Circuit’s application of strict 
scrutiny; whereas Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter, 
holding that she would have upheld the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision. 
217  However, both 
Justices have retired and have since been replaced 
respectively by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.  Given Justice 
Sotomayor was a President Obama nominee and had a 
reputation for siding with the Court’s liberal bloc when the 
justices are divided along ideological lines, 218  many 
anticipated the Justice would vote to uphold the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling.  Ultimately and unexpectedly, however, 
Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion vacating the 
Circuit court ruling, agreeing that “in order for judicial 
review to be meaningful, a university must make a showing 
that its plan is narrowly tailored to achieve . . . diversity.”219
 
 215. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803. 
 
 216. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Limit the Use of Race in School Plans for 
Integration, N.Y.TIMES (June 29, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/29/ 
washington/29scotus.html. 
 217. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 837. 
 218. David G. Savage, Sotomayor Votes Reliably With Supreme Court’s 
Liberal Wing, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jun/08/ 
nation/la-na-court-sotomayor-20100609. 
219  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2012).  
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B. Justice Kennedy’s Court 
When the Supreme Court decided Parents Involved in 
2007, it had the opportunity to overrule Grutter and severely 
alter the affirmative action landscape.  Particularly indicative 
of the likelihood for such a change, when the Court handed 
down Parents Involved, Justice O’Connor, the author of 
Grutter’s majority opinion, had retired from the bench and 
was replaced by conservative Justice Samuel Alito.  However, 
despite this chance to overrule Grutter, the Court passed on 
this opportunity to invalidate affirmative action.  Instead, the 
Court merely curtailed much of Grutter’s significance in Part 
III(A) of the majority opinion, first by applying a tougher form 
of strict scrutiny to the two school districts’ student 
assignment plans, 220  in contrast to Grutter’s generous 
allocation of deference, and second by emphasizing the 
importance of individualized, holistic determinations in the 
selection process over any discussion of the importance of 
racial diversity. 221   The Court even acknowledged that 
student body diversity is a compelling governmental 
interest222 and invalidated Seattle’s admissions program only 
because it amounted to racial balancing that “rel[ied] on 
racial classifications in a ‘nonindividualized, mechanical’ 
way.”223
This begs the question: why merely narrow Grutter?  
Why did the Court relinquish an opportunity to overrule a 
decision Justice Kennedy described as “antithetical to strict 
scrutiny” jurisprudence only three years earlier?
 
224
While Justice Kennedy dissented in Grutter
  The 
answer to these questions lie in Justice Kennedy and the 
delicate balance the Court in Parents Involved had to strike 
in order to obtain his vote for Parts I, II, III(A), and III(C) of 
the majority opinion. 
225  and 
concurred in Parts I, II, III(A), and III(C) in Parents 
Involved,226
 
 220. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 720. 
 in each decision Justice Kennedy wrote separate 
opinions that revealed notable ideological distinctions from 
 221. Id. at 722–23. 
 222. Id. at 721. 
 223. Id. at 723. 
 224. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 387. 
 226. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782. 
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the justices who merely agreed with his conclusion.227  In 
Grutter, Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority “that a 
university admissions program may take account of race as 
one, nonpredominant [admissions] factor,”228 however Justice 
Kennedy condemned and ultimately dissented from what he 
viewed as “the majority’s abandonment of strict scrutiny.”229  
According to Justice Kennedy, deference should only be given 
to a university’s decision that racial diversity will promote the 
institution’s overall education mission, while the means the 
university utilizes to attain that objective should require 
strict judicial review.230
Justice Kennedy further emphasized this position later in 
his Grutter dissent, stating that conferring deference upon a 
university’s means to attain racial diversity “is antithetical to 
strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”
 
231   The danger 
associated with such deference, Justice Kennedy admonished, 
is that universities will not be forced “to seriously explore 
race-neutral alternatives . . . [and] [i]f universities are given 
[such wide] latitude . . . they will have few incentives to make 
the existing minority admissions schemes transparent and 
protective of individual review.”232  Without these pressures 
to explore such neutral alternatives, Justice Kennedy 
forewarned that the “unhappy consequence will be to 
perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race is 
designed to avoid.  The perpetuation, of course, would be the 
worst of all outcomes.”233
Perhaps what is most compelling about Justice 
Kennedy’s perspective in Grutter, and most indicative of his 
future views on Fisher, came at the very end of his dissent.  
Justice Kennedy condemned the Court for “abdicat[ing] its 
constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the use of race in 
university admissions,” stating that such an omission 
“negat[ed] [its] authority to approve the use of race in pursuit 
of student diversity.”
 
234
 
 227. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 782. 
  However, despite his overt 
 228. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387. 
 229. Id. at 394. 
 230. Id. at 388. 
 231. Id. at 394. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 395. 
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disapproval of the majority’s failure to exact strict scrutiny 
upon the university’s race-based admissions policy, the last 
sentence in Justice Kennedy’s dissent articulated his support 
of affirmative action policies if such strict scrutiny is in place, 
stating: “I reiterate my approval of giving appropriate 
consideration to race in this one context.”235
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents Involved even 
more starkly conveyed his ideological distinctions from the 
majority opinion.
   
236  Responding to Chief Justice Roberts and 
his insistence that “ ‘ [t]he way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,’ ”237 
Justice Kennedy emphasized that “[f]ifty years of experience 
since Brown v. Board of Education should teach us that the 
problem before us defies so easy a solution.”238  Additionally, 
and contrary to the Parents Involved majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence emphasized that “[d]iversity  
. . . is a compelling education goal a school district may 
pursue,”239 and further asserted that the Court’s decision 
“should not prevent school districts from continuing the 
important work of bringing together students of different 
racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds.”240
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence also focused on the school 
district’s use of “crude racial categories of ‘white’ and ‘non-
white’ as the basis for its assignment decisions” in a school 
district occupied by several different racially diverse 
groups.
 
241  Justice Kennedy asserted that the school district 
failed to unambiguously articulate how such “a blunt 
distinction between ‘white’ and ‘non-white’ further[ed] [its 
diversity] goals,”242 and declared that strict scrutiny “cannot 
construe [such] ambiguities in favor of the State.”243
 
 235. Id. 
  Further 
affirming this position, and echoing his support of strict 
scrutiny in his Grutter dissent, Justice Kennedy expressed 
that such indefiniteness illustrated that the school district 
 236. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
782 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 237. Id. at 788 (quoting plurality opinion). 
 238. Id. (citation omitted). 
 239. Id. at 783. 
 240. Id. at 798. 
 241. Id. at 786. 
 242. Id. at 787. 
 243. Id. at 786. 
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had “not shown its plan to be narrowly tailored to achieve its 
own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny.”244 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s criticism of the school district’s 
race-conscious admissions policy, he articulated a similar 
criticism for the plurality opinion, stating that “[t]o the extent 
the plurality opinion suggests the Constitution mandates that 
state and local school authorities must accept the status quo 
of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly 
mistaken.” 245   Similar to his dissent in Grutter, Justice 
Kennedy approved of school authorities considering “the 
racial makeup of schools and . . . adopt[ing] general policies to 
encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which is its 
racial composition.” 246   Unlike the plurality’s unyielding 
position that “[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of 
race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,”247 Justice 
Kennedy held that school administrators concerned with 
racial diversity issues within their district are “free to devise 
race-conscious measures to address the problem in a general 
way and without treating each student in different fashion 
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by 
race.”248 
Justice Kennedy even postulated several methods 
administrators may implement in order to attain such 
diversity, such as “strategic site selection of new schools; 
drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for 
special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a 
targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and 
other statistics by race.”249  Under Justice Kennedy’s view, 
such mechanisms, although race conscious, would not lead to 
treatment “based on a classification that tells each student he 
or she is to be defined by race.”250
It is also notable that Justice Kennedy did not join Part 
IV of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in Parents Involved, a 
section that primarily criticizes Justice Breyer’s dissenting 
 
 
 244. Id. at 787. 
 245. Id. at 788. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 748. 
 248. Id. at 788–89. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
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opinion. 251   In Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, he 
openly stated that his refusal to join Part IV of the Chief 
Justice’s opinion is based on the plurality’s refusal to 
“acknowledge that the school districts h[ad] identified a 
compelling interest [in increasing diversity].”252  In contrast to 
this position taken by the plurality, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that “[d]iversity, depending on its meaning and 
definition, is a compelling educational goal a school district 
may pursue.”253  Unlike the plurality’s position in Part IV, 
Justice Kennedy argued that school authorities “are free to 
devise race-conscious measures to address the [diversity] 
problem in a general way and without treating each student 
in different fashion solely on the basis of a systematic, 
individual typing by race.”254 
Justice Kennedy voiced a similar concern about 
systematic, individual typing by race with the Law School’s 
critical mass justifications in his Grutter dissent, claiming 
that “[w]hether the objective of critical mass ‘is described as a 
quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and 
ethnic status,’ and so risks compromising individual 
assessment.”255  In Grutter, daily reports informed admissions 
personnel whether they were short of assembling a critical 
mass of minority students, and Justice Kennedy observed 
that such “consultation of daily reports during the last stages 
in the admissions process suggest[ed] there was no further 
attempt at individual review save for race itself.”256  Because 
of this failure to implement a safeguard throughout the entire 
admissions process protecting individual review, Justice 
Kennedy deemed the Law School’s policy unconstitutional.257
Unlike Justice Sotomayor, whose questions during oral 
arguments clearly showed her preference for the University of 
Texas’ admissions program,
 
258
 
 251. Id. at 735–48. 
 Justice Kennedy’s line of 
questioning during oral arguments did not overly reveal his 
position, as he stringently challenged both sides with his 
 252. Id. at 783. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 788–89. 
 255. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 391 (2003) (quoting Regents of Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 US 265, 289 (1978)). 
 256. Id. at 392. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 118, at 14. 
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questions and comments.  During oral arguments, Justice 
Kennedy scrutinized inconsistencies in the petitioner’s 
position, stating: 
You argue that the University’s race-conscious admission 
plan is not necessary to achieve a diverse student body 
because it admits . . . so few minorities . . . Then—let’s 
assume—that it resulted in the admission of many 
minorities.  Then you’d come back and say, oh, well, this 
 . . . shows that we—we were probably wrongly excluded.  
I—I see an inconsistency here.259
Conversely, Justice Kennedy heavily scrutinized the 
University of Texas’ oral argument, responding to the 
university’s contention that their holistic admissions process 
only modestly considered race by bluntly stating, “I just don't 
understand this argument.  I thought that the whole point is 
that sometimes race has to be a tie-breaker and you are 
saying that it isn't.  Well, then, we should just go away.  
Then—then we should just say you can't use race, don't worry 
about it.”
 
260
Justice Kennedy’s idiosyncratic perspectives in both 
Grutter and Parents Involved illustrate why the Court’s 
conservative bloc was unable to overrule Grutter when the 
opportunity presented itself in 2007.  In the 2009-2010 term, 
Justice Kennedy was in the majority ninety-two percent of 
the time,
 
261 and, over the last six years, when the Court is 
ideologically split five-to-four on a controversial issue, Justice 
Kennedy has been in the majority more than seventy percent 
of the time. 262  If the plurality in Parents Involved had 
obstinately insisted on declassifying student body diversity as 
a compelling governmental interest, it risked alienating 
Justice Kennedy and pushing him into the Court’s opposing 
ideological camp; and, given that Parents Involved was a five-
to-four decision,263
 
 259. Id. at 22–23. 
 such a result would have changed the 
 260. Id. at 63. 
 261. Adam Liptak, Roberts Court Shifts Right, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 30, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/us/01scotus.html? 
adxnnl=1&pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1325847640-
K43GimBUMxzPvCjJRjVQkQ. 
 262. Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinksky: Momentous Term for the  
“Kennedy Court”?, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 3, 2011), http://abajournal.com/news/ 
article/momentous_term_for_the_kennedy_court/. 
 263. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
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case’s outcome.  Such inflexibility would risk losing Justice 
Kennedy’s vote, and consequently prevent the Court from, at 
the very least, narrowing Grutter’s applicability. 
When the Supreme Court announced its opinion in 
Fisher, it was fitting that Justice Kennedy wrote the majority 
opinion that ultimately vacated the Fifth Circuit’s decision.  
Furthermore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion adhered to the 
principles and opinions he had articulated regarding 
affirmative action throughout his tenure on the Court.  While 
Justice Kennedy had advocated in both Grutter and Parents 
Involved that student body diversity is a compelling 
governmental interest, these opinions insisted even more 
emphatically that such race-based considerations must be 
implemented in accordance with strict scrutiny.264  Justice 
Kennedy had similarly criticized granting incalculable 
deference to universities executing these purposefully 
discriminatory policies, 265 arguing that such “deference is 
antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.” 266   
Given one of UT’s main arguments in Fisher was that courts 
must defer to the educational expertise that composed their 
race-based admissions policy,267 it was not unforeseeable that 
such voiced entitlement to judicial deference would repel 
Justice Kennedy, as he had always adhered to the principle 
that such deference confounds the fundamental notions of 
strict scrutiny.268
Despite its failure to persuade Justice Kennedy’s 
decision, there was one factor that could have persuaded the 
Justice to accept UT’s race-conscious admissions policy in 
Fisher.  In his Parents Involved concurrence, Justice Kennedy 
significantly distinguished Grutter’s approved diversity plan 
from the Seattle School District plan, stating that, unlike 
Grutter’s plan, which “considered race as only one factor 
among many,”
 
269
 
707 (2007). 
 the Seattle School District’s plan applied “a 
mechanical formula that ha[d] denied hundreds of students 
 264. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 256 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 268. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394. 
 269. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
793 (2007). 
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their preferred school on the basis of three rigid criteria: 
placement of siblings, distance from schools, and race.”270  If 
the school district’s plan had evaluated its students “for a 
whole range of their talents and school needs with race as 
just one consideration,” it is likely Justice Kennedy would 
have considered Grutter as guiding precedent. 271  Justice 
Kennedy could have viewed UT’s program as analogous to 
Grutter’s approved plan, as it merely considers race as one of 
several different factors in its admissions process;272
Although efforts to predict an affirmative action program 
that Justice Kennedy would approve of are purely conjectural, 
analyzing his Parents Involved, Grutter, and Fisher opinions 
reveal the fundamental rubric such an accepted program 
would probably possess.  First, given his abhorrence for 
liberally conferring deference upon the means academic 
administrators choose to implement race-conscious 
admissions policies,
 however, 
the Justice ultimately chose to ignore the existence of this 
congruency. 
273  Justice Kennedy would likely only 
approve of an affirmative action policy that showed deference 
to the university’s decision that a racially diverse student 
body will contribute to its overall educational goals.  Second, 
the Justice has repeatedly voiced the dangers inherent in 
assessing race in a non-holistic, non-individualized manner;274 
thus, an approved admissions program considering race 
would have to follow Grutter’s framework and view race as 
merely “one factor among many.”275
Third, unlike the Seattle School District’s program, 
which failed strict scrutiny after it could not “account for the 
[racial] classification system it ha[d] chosen,”
 
276  an 
affirmative action policy that Justice Kennedy would approve 
of must show studies and statistics that persuasively support 
its use of racial distinctions, “show[ing] its plan to be 
narrowly tailored to achieve its own ends.”277
 
 270. Id. 
  Finally, Justice 
 271. Id. 
 272. Fisher, 631 F.3d at 228. 
 273. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394. 
 274. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 391; Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788. 
 275. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 793. 
 276. Id. at 787. 
 277. Id. 
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Kennedy stated in his Parents Involved concurrence that 
affirmative action programs that “are race conscious but do 
not lead to different treatment based on a [racial] 
classification” may not even demand strict scrutiny in order 
to be found permissible.278  The Justice even gave several 
examples of tolerable race conscious measures, such as 
strategically selecting the sites of new schools and drawing 
attendance zones with a mind towards the neighborhood 
demographics.279
CONCLUSION 
  Given this perspective, if a school district or 
university were to implement a race-conscious admissions 
policy without a dissimilar racial impact, Justice Kennedy 
would be more likely to approve of the program. 
The Court’s decision in Fisher did not alter Grutter’s 
significance, leaving it to a future Supreme Court decision to 
elucidate the numerous ambiguities that still encompass the 
controversial subject of affirmative action.  Instead of 
reshaping the boundaries regarding affirmative action, or 
creating a scenario where affirmative action was invalidated 
altogether, the Fisher opinion essentially left the legal 
landscape undisturbed.  While it is clear from Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion, as well as his opinion in Parents 
Involved and Grutter, that he is a proponent of racial 
diversity as a compelling interest, 280  these opinions also 
unambiguously illustrate Justice Kennedy’s strict adherence 
to the principles of strict scrutiny.281  If too much deference is 
given to a university’s implementation of race-based 
considerations, such a policy, in Justice Kennedy’s eyes, will 
fail to surmount the strict scrutiny hurdle.282  Unfortunately 
for UT’s admissions policy, the Fifth Circuit conferred 
unyielding deference to UT’s policy when the court upheld the 
judgment of the lower district court. 283
 
 278. Id. at 788. 
  Consequentially, 
Justice Kennedy’s Fisher opinion articulated the same 
position he held in Grutter, that such deference “is 
 279. Id. 
 280. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387 (2003); Parents Involved, 551 
U.S. at 783. 
 281. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 232 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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antithetical to strict scrutiny, not consistent with it.”284
Nevertheless, even though Justice Kennedy may 
disapprove of the Fifth Circuit’s deferential demeanor 
towards UT’s admissions policy, Grutter’s principle holding, 
that student body diversity is a compelling interest,
 
285
After Fisher, the same opacities that have encompassed 
affirmative action post-Grutter and Parents Involved 
continue to exist.  But despite such unanswered questions, 
the Court did make one resounding clarification in 
determining that the deference bestowed upon universities 
and the “presumed good faith” afforded their race-based 
considerations
 
remains good law post-Fisher.  But despite Grutter’s 
continued relevance, several questions regarding the 
interpretation of that ruling continue to remain.  Future 
Supreme Court decisions must decide the pertinent questions 
that Fisher raised, but left unanswered, such as the extent to 
which a university’s “expert opinion” should be afforded due 
deference, or precisely what measures should be used to 
determine whether “critical masses” of underrepresented 
minority students have been obtained. 
286 confound the fundamental essence of strict 
scrutiny, allowing purposeful discrimination without 
significant judicial scrutiny.287  The Court capitalized on that 
opportunity to clarify that facet of Grutter, taking a small but 
measureable step toward the temporal approximation Justice 
O’Connor articulated in Grutter.  Post-Fisher, the legal 
landscape as it relates to affirmative action has taken a 
perceptible step towards the principles articulated in 
Korematsu: that legal restrictions curtailing the rights of a 
single racial group must be subjected to the strictest of 
scrutiny.288
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